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THE LEGAL IN/SECURITY OF TEMPORARY 
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORK: CASE 
STUDIES FROM CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 
ANDREW NEWMAN∗ 
Despite differing labour law systems and program structures, temporary 
migrant agricultural workers under the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Program and Australian Seasonal Worker Program often possess 
minimal security of employment rights and protections, despite potentially 
lengthy periods of consecutive seasonal service to the same employer. Such 
lesser rights and protections are partly due to the central role played by 
continuity of service in determining the length of reasonable notice periods 
and the strength of unfair dismissal protections and stand-down/recall 
rights. Although it is often presumed that the temporary duration of the 
seasonal work visa necessarily severs the legal continuity of the 
employment relationship, such is not the case. This article argues that 
security of employment rights and protections can be re-conceptualised to 
recognise non-continuous seasonal service within the current parameters of 
a fixed-term work visa. In both Canada and Australia this could be 
accomplished through contractual or collective agreement terms or through 
the amendment of labour law legislation. Such reforms would recognise a 
form of unpaid ‘migrant worker leave’, whereby the legal continuity of 
employment would be preserved despite periods of mandatory repatriation, 
thus allowing accrual of security of employment rights and protections. 
I INTRODUCTION  
Both Australian and Canadian labour law systems recognise that notice of 
termination requirements, unfair dismissal protections and recall/stand-down 
rights are key modes of legally regulating security of employment. Both 
labour law systems also recognise that the accrual of continuous service is the 
primary method by which employees move along a continuum towards 
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increasing rights and protections.1 However, the default form of employment 
relationship with respect to temporary migrant agricultural workers in both 
countries is a fixed-term seasonal contract. Such contracts frequently prevent 
the accrual of continuous service, thus limiting the rights and protections 
available to temporary migrant workers.2 This limitation occurs regardless of 
the duration of such workers’ service to the same employer over the course of 
multiple seasonal work visas.3  
However, this default labour law setting is based on a legal fiction. In both 
countries, it is presupposed that the migration law parameters of the 
Australian Seasonal Worker Program (‘ASWP’) and the Canadian Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Program (‘CSAWP’) necessitate the imposition of a 
fixed-term seasonal contract. This article will argue that although the 
combined effect of migration and labour law currently disadvantages 
temporary migrant workers in this way, this need not be the case. The labour 
law systems of both countries are sufficiently flexible to permit the 
recognition of a form of migrant worker leave. This leave would act to protect 
the legal continuity of employment despite seasonal lay-off and repatriation 
and thus facilitate the accrual of security of employment rights and 
protections. Migrant worker leave could be recognised through a range of 
labour law mechanisms, including through collective bargaining, adoption of 
standard form clauses in individual contracts and/or statutory reform of 
employment standards. Recognising migrant worker leave through these 
mechanisms would represent a fundamental departure from current practice. 
The potential for such reforms exists notwithstanding the current seasonal 
parameters of the temporary work visa prescribed by the CSAWP and ASWP. 
Such reforms would build upon tentative measures that have already been 
taken in both Canada and Australia to de-couple the accrual of labour law 
rights and entitlements from the accrual of continuous service. This article is 
composed of four main parts. The first (under heading II below) will provide a 
general introduction to the issue of legally precarious employment in the 
agricultural sector. The second (under heading III below) will discuss the 
relevant conceptual background to the problem. The following part will 
engage in an examination of the labour law regulation of security of 
employment in both Canada and Australia. In particular, it will consider how 
CSAWP and ASWP workers are generally disadvantaged with respect to 
notice of termination, unfair dismissal and employment standards protection 
by virtue of their inability to accrue continuity of employment. The last part 
(under heading V below) will provide concluding thoughts and briefly outline 
potential options for recognising continuity of employment through a form of 
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migrant worker leave enshrined in standard form contracts, collective 
bargaining agreements and statute.   
II THE LEGAL PRECARIOUSNESS OF TEMPORARY 
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORK 
Legally precarious employment has grown markedly in many developed 
economies in recent decades, including Canada and Australia.4 The rise of 
legally precarious employment has been viewed as a by-product of the drive 
towards so-called ‘flexible’ labour markets at both the domestic and 
international levels.5 The term ‘flexibility’ is often a euphemism for either 
reducing the level of existing worker protections or permitting employers to 
exploit gaps in the regulatory framework.6 In part as a result of this drive 
toward flexible markets, a growing inequality has developed in international 
labour migration law. In certain sectors (such as the resources, science, 
management and health sectors) of developed economies, employers actively 
compete in an international labour market to hire well-paid, formally skilled 
workers who are frequently offered a fast track to permanent residency. By 
contrast, unskilled agricultural workers from developing countries are far less 
likely to obtain entrance via the general migration law channels due to their 
inability to satisfy migration law systems weighted towards attracting 
formally skilled migrants.7 Targeted industry-based temporary labour  
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migration programs therefore often represent the primary means by which 
unskilled foreign workers legally obtain restricted access to developed world 
labour markets. In ‘triple D’ (dirty, degrading and dangerous) sectors such as 
agriculture, often referred to as the bargain basement of globalisation,8 such 
programs have proliferated across the developed world. This growth in 
temporary migrant labour programs in Canada and Australia has been partly 
necessitated by the movement of local unskilled workers away from less 
desired employment towards highly paid resource sector work.9 The rise of 
unskilled temporary labour migration has been characterised by scholars of 
legally precarious work as part of a drive towards ‘numerical flexibility’.10 
Participating employers are provided with access to a vast supply of unskilled 
workers available on the global labour market. Such workers may be hired 
during peak periods of demand and repatriated to their country of origin until 
further required, with little or no accrual of labour law rights and 
protections.11 Unskilled temporary migrant worker programs are therefore 
frequently characterised as an increasingly prominent manifestation of legally 
precarious work,12 despite the professed objectives of governments to protect 
decent terms and conditions of employment.13  
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With respect to the choice of the term ‘precarious’ employment, it is worth 
noting that other terms such as ‘non-standard’, ‘atypical’, ‘insecure’ and 
‘contingent’ employment have also been used in the literature to reflect the 
same or similar concepts.14 A preference for one term over another depends in 
part upon local context and usage.15 The academic literature does not adopt a 
consistent definition of legally precarious work across all countries, sectors 
and groups of workers16 but notes that it takes many frequently overlapping 
forms, such as: fixed-term, part-time or casual work, self-employment, work 
as an independent contractor, labour hire, on-call, home or agency work.17  
Each of these forms of legally precarious work has its origins in multiple 
sources of labour law regulation.18 Legal scholars in the field have therefore 
analysed the problem of legal precariousness through a doctrinal 
consideration of the following main sources of law that regulate it: (i) the 
individual contract of employment;19 (ii) collective regulation, including 
awards and collective agreements;20 (iii) employment standards legislation;21 
(iv) anti-discrimination law;22 (v) unfair dismissal legislation;23 and (vi) 
labour relations legislation governing collective bargaining rights.24  
                                                 
14 Judy Fudge, ‘Beyond Vulnerable Workers: Towards a New Standard Employment 
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15 Ibid 156–7. 
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18 This article will refer to ‘labour law’ in the Australian sense, as encompassing both collective 
and individual aspects of the legal regulation of the employment relationship. The North 
American convention, by contrast, is to delineate between ‘employment law’ and ‘labour 
law’. The former refers to the legal regulation of the relationship between non-unionised 
employees and their employers. The latter refers to the legal regulation of the relationship 
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Rosemary Owens, Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenges to Legal 
Norms (Hart Publishing , 2006) 283, 290–5. 
21 See, eg, Kirkpatrick, above n 19. See also Gillian Barnett, ‘Employment Standards for Non-
Standard Employment: A Legislative Framework for Agency Work in Canada’ (2008) 13 
Appeal 74. 
22 See, eg, Adell, above n 20, 1048–53. See also Katerine V M Stone, ‘The New Face of 
Employment Discrimination’ in Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens, Precarious Work, Women 
and the New Economy: The Challenges to Legal Norms (Hart Publishing, 2006) 243. 
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Each form of legal regulation has been considered as providing a source of 
legal precariousness, usually due to the fact that the protective thrust of the 
regulation continues to privilege the standard employment relationship 
(‘SER’) over other forms of work. The SER, which is frequently defined in 
the literature as an ongoing, full-time employment relationship with a single 
employer25 is generally characterised by greater legal rights and protections, 
including those pertaining to security of employment.  
However, despite acting as a source of legal precariousness, labour law may 
also be structured so as to expand the scope of its protective coverage and 
close gaps in the regulatory network of rights and protections, thereby also 
acting as a vehicle through which to reduce legal precariousness.26  
Just as the legal forms of precariousness are many, so too are the frequently 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing indices of the employment relationship 
which define it. As noted by Owens, Riley and Murray, the Secure 
Employment Test Case27 in Australia demonstrated that legally precarious 
workers with insecure employment also experience a heightened incidence of 
other workplace risks including:  
a greater chance of non-compliance with occupational health and safety 
standards; poor wages and conditions of work that did not meet basic award 
standards; and less access to training and skills development, and hence to 
career development. The repercussions of this then spilled over into private 
life: the uncertainties meant, for instance, that non-standard workers had 
more limited access to finance.28 
Lack of employment security is therefore one important attribute of legal 
precariousness and often associated with other attributes, such as low wages, a 
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Univeristy Press, 2011) 297, 299. 
26 Owens, above n 6, 340–52; Stone, above n 22, 259–63. 
27 (2006) 150 IR 1. 
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low incidence of collective bargaining, low levels of trade union membership 
and little control over working conditions or environment.  
As to the definition of security of employment, it is itself a wide concept, 
which includes the legal rights and protections governing the termination of 
employment. Gerry Rodgers and Janine Rodgers identified four dimensions to 
security of employment, including one of particular relevance to this article: 
‘the extent of legal protections applicable to workers’.29 Building upon the 
work of Gerry Rodgers and Janine Rodgers, Australian scholars John Burgess 
and Iain Campbell described eight forms of insecurity, noting that one key 
aspect of insecurity exists when workers can be dismissed or laid off or put on 
shorter time without difficulty.30  
As this overview may suggest, migration law in particular plays a pivotal role 
in constituting the labour market in which labour law operates.31 Scholars in 
the field have noted that, though temporary migrant workers may share 
various attributes of vulnerability with local workers, they face additional 
factors of vulnerability which informs the particular manifestation of their 
legal precariousness.32 In the specific context of Ontario, Canada, Faraday 
argues that the four categories of low-skill temporary migrant workers present 
in the province often experience insecure employment, which is constructed 
                                                 
29 Gerry Rodgers, ‘Precarious Work in Western Europe: The State of the Debate’ in Gerry 
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30 John Burgess and Iain Campbell, ‘The Nature and Dimensions of Precarious Employment in 
Australia’ (1998) 8(3) Labour and Industry 5, 11. 
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‘Recommodifying Time: Working Hours of “Live-In” Domestic Workers’ in Joanne 
Conaghan and Kerry Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and Family (Oxford University Press, 
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32 Tham and Campbell, ‘Temporary Migrant Labour in Australia’, above n 31, 37; Joo-Cheong 
Tham and Iain Campbell, ‘Equal Treatment for Temporary Migrant Workers and the 
Challenge of Their Precariousness’ (Paper presented at ILERA (IIRA) 16th World Congress, 
July 2012) 18–19 <http://www.ilera2012.wharton.upenn.edu/RefereedPapers/ThamJoo 
CheongIainCampbell.pdf>. 
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by law at each stage of the migration process.33 Many of these factors are tied 
to what Tham and Campbell (in Australia) and Goldring, Berinstein and 
Bernhard (in Canada) refer to as ‘precarious migration status’.34 As noted by 
Tham and Campbell, for temporary migrant workers, ‘their precarious 
migration status is inextricably linked to a risk of precarious employment’.35 
While a comprehensive examination of the many interactions between 
migration and labour laws governing the CSAWP and ASWP is beyond the 
scope of this article, it will focus on one prominent interaction: that between 
the seasonal work visa and the accrual of security of employment rights and 
protections at law.  
III THE IN/SECURITY OF TEMPORARY MIGRANT 
AGRICULTURAL WORK  
A How is Security of Employment Legally Regulated 
in Canada and Australia? 
The legal rights and protections governing the ease with which workers may 
be dismissed may be derived from a wide range of training, retention, work 
sharing and consultation provisions contained in a variety of legal sources.36 
However, the analysis in this article will focus on three of the most commonly 
recognised labour law aspects of security of employment present in both 
countries: (i) notice of termination, (ii) unfair dismissal protections37 and 
(iii) recall rights, broadly construed. It is important to note that while each of 
these mechanisms plays a role in governing the ease of dismissal, they have 
different focuses and rationales and play different roles within the overall 
system of labour law protection in each country. A brief explanation of the 
differing legal framework in each country is therefore required by way of 
background.  
                                                 
33 Fay Faraday, Made in Canada: How the Law Constructs Migrant Worker Insecurity 
(September 2012) Metcalf Foundation 7 <http://metcalffoundation.com/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/09/Made-in-Canada-Full-Report.pdf>. 
34 Tham and Campbell, ‘Equal Treatment’, above n 32, 17 citing Goldring, Berinstein and 
Bernard, above n 12, 239. 
35 Tham and Campbell, ‘Equal Treatment’, above n 32, 19. 
36 Steffen Lehndorff and Thomas Haipeter, ‘Negotiating Employment Security: Innovations 
and Derogations’ in Susan Hayter (ed), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global 
Economy: Negotiating for Social Justice (Edward Elgar, 2011) 20. 
37 Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Job Security Laws: Constituting “Standard” and “Non-Standard” 
Employment’ in Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation 
(Federation Press, 2006) 657, 659. 
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Notice of termination traditionally derives from the law of contract, which 
focuses solely on whether sufficient contractual notice of the impending 
termination (or payment in lieu thereof) is given by the employer to the 
worker, rather than whether the termination itself was fair.38 This classical 
contractual method of lessening the insecurity of employment applies in 
Canada, where notice requirements are established by individual contract and 
by employment standards legislation, which operates to set a floor to 
reasonable notice entitlements.39 Similarly, in Australia, notice of termination 
is governed by the contract of employment and a floor is set by the National 
Employment Standards (‘NES’), the modern award or, alternatively, in 
enterprise agreements.40  
In Australia, the common law protections were supplemented by legislation, 
and an additional and stronger level of protection against unfair dismissal was 
created. In Australia, unfair dismissal legislation protects eligible non-
probationary employees (whether unionised or not) against dismissal that is 
‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’41 and offers either reinstatement or capped 
damages as a legislated remedy.42 Enterprise agreements may not vary the 
rights or procedures enshrined in the unfair dismissal provisions of the Fair 
Work Act (‘FWA’), although they may create termination procedures to be 
followed by employers.43 By contrast, in Canada, in most jurisdictions, no 
such unfair dismissal legislation has been enacted. Instead, unfair dismissal 
rights and protections are generally left to unions to negotiate by way of 
collective agreements, the status and creation of which are governed by labour 
relations legislation.44 Such agreements protect non-probationary employees 
in certified (that is, unionised) bargaining units against dismissal except for 
‘just cause’, subject to a right to reinstatement or a substituted lesser 
discipline ordered by a private grievance arbitrator.45  
In sectors with varying levels of production (such as manufacturing), both 
Australian and Canadian labour law also recognises ‘recall rights’ for workers 
laid off or stood down due to temporary lack of work. Recall to work is often 
governed by the concept of seniority (the ‘first in, last out’ principle) and legal 
                                                 
38 Owens, Riley and Murray, above n 4, 481–2. 
39 Rita Mason, Janine Truelove and Carol Dakai (eds), The Canadian Master Labour Guide 
(CCH Canada, 22nd ed, 2008) 373–4. 
40 Andrew Stewart, Stewart’s Guide to Employment Law (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 290–
3. 
41 FWA s 385(b). 
42 Ibid s 390. 
43 Stewart, above n 40, 297; FWA s 194. 
44 Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c-244 (‘BCLRC’).  
45 BCLRC s 89. 
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continuity of the employment relationship is preserved. Employment 
standards legislation in Canada recognises periods of ‘temporary lay-off’ 
during which the employment relationship is maintained for the purposes of 
minimal statutory entitlements, so long as the worker is recalled to work 
within various specified periods of time.46 Seniority-based recall rights are 
also commonly included in collective agreements, which then supplant the 
minimum employment standards.47 The Australian FWA also reflects the 
concept through ‘stand-down’ protections, where legal continuity of 
employment is preserved48 when the ‘employee cannot usefully be employed’ 
because of ‘a stoppage of work for any cause for which the employer cannot 
reasonably be held responsible’.49 Alternatively, the FWA provision will not 
apply where the issue of stand-down is addressed by an enterprise agreement 
or individual contract.50 This article therefore adopts a wide definition of 
‘recall rights’ as legally protected exceptions to the wages/work bargain 
resulting from a temporary downturn in work, where the employee is entitled 
to return to his or her previous position once work again becomes available.  
One problem with the Canadian model of security of employment is that the 
existence of unfair dismissal protections and recall rights (beyond statutory 
‘temporary lay-off’ provisions) generally depends upon successful enterprise 
level collective bargaining. In the Canadian agricultural sector, union density 
(which in Canada is largely synonymous with collective agreement coverage) 
is just 5.25 per cent.51 Agriculture has long been subject to sectoral exclusion 
from collective bargaining legislation of general application (as it still is in 
Ontario and Alberta) and other labour law legislation.52 Even in provinces that 
do provide agricultural workers with collective bargaining rights, agreement 
coverage remains very low for a variety of reasons. Chief among these is the 
fact that Canada’s predominant Wagner Act53 model of collective bargaining 
generally requires a union to successfully demonstrate majority support before 
the union obtains bargaining rights with respect to workers in the enterprise 
level ‘bargaining unit’.54 Such a model is ill-suited to the precarious labour 
                                                 
46 Mason, Truelove and Dakai, above n 39, 382, 391. 
47 Ibid 383; Faraday, above n 33, 40. 
48 FWA s 22(2)(ii). 
49 FWA s 524(1). 
50 FWA s 524(2). 
51 Eric Tucker, ‘Farm Worker Exceptionalism: Past, Present, and the Post-Fraser Future’ in Fay 
Farady, Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker (eds), Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm 
Workers and the Fraser Case (Irwin Law, 2012) 30, 51–2. 
52 Ibid 35–7. 
53 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 USC. 
54 Mason, Truelove and Dakai, above n 39, 812–13. 
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market realities of farm workers generally.55 For example, precarious workers 
themselves often fear employer reprisals for participating in unionisation 
drives.56 In addition, unions lack sufficient resources to certify (that is, 
‘unionise’) small and remote agricultural bargaining units. As a result of 
Canada’s low level of agricultural unionisation and collective bargaining 
coverage, any examination of security of employment in Canada focuses 
primarily on the notice of termination provisions contained in a standard form 
employment contract (‘SFEC’) that applies to CSAWP workers and on the 
applicable provincial employment standards legislation. Nevertheless, in this 
article consideration will also be given to the few innovative collective 
bargaining agreements concluded with respect to CSAWP workers.  
In Australia, by contrast, the focus of this article will be on the safety net and 
legislative standards generally applicable to agricultural workers, including 
the Horticulture Award 2010 and the FWA, including the NES and provisions 
governing unfair dismissal protections and stand-down rights. Interviews 
conducted by the author, in Australia in August 2012, with unions and 
government regulators57 indicated that although a few enterprise agreements 
do cover ASWP workers, they do not deviate from the safety net and 
legislative standards considered in this article. Similarly, individual contracts 
of employment (which in Australia continue to exist despite the presence of 
collective industrial instruments) are important to the contractual 
characterisation of the employment relationship and the legal rights that 
accompany it (that is, whether the employment relationship is casual or not). 
However, interviews indicated that, with respect to ASWP workers, such 
individual contracts were of an oral or minimalist ‘letter offer’ type. As with 
enterprise agreements, individual contracts did not deviate from safety net 
standards contained in the Horticulture Award 2010 and legislation. 
                                                 
55 Tucker, above n 51, 37, 46, 50. 
56 Wayne Hanley, ‘The Roots of Organizing Agricultural Workers in Canada’ in Fay Faraday, 
Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker (eds), Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers 
and the Fraser Case (Irwin Law, 2012) 59. 
57 Interviews were approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee, University of 
Melbourne in conjunction with the author’s PhD research. Interviews were conducted on an 
anonymous basis to encourage frank discussion. Interviews were conducted with officials of 
an Australian governmental labour law enforcement agency on 7 August 2012, and with 
union officials on 16 August 2012. 
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B Determining the Applicable Benchmark of Secure 
Employment for Temporary Migrant Agricultural 
Workers 
As a starting point, temporary migrant workers are entitled to protections at 
international law at least as favourable as those enjoyed by local workers.58 
However, local workers’ employment in the agricultural sector is also 
frequently (though not exclusively) legally insecure, with workers often being 
employed casually or on fixed-term seasonal contracts.59 Comparing one form 
of legal precariousness against another does not appear to the author to be 
desirable from a normative perspective. Therefore, this article provides a 
broader, more conceptually based comparator than a local worker in the same 
sector. In this regard, the model of the SER (a standard, full-time, ongoing 
employment relationship with a single employer) is frequently held up as a 
model of decent work in Canada and Australia. The SER continues to be the 
regulatory pivot60 of both labour law systems, as it attracts the fullest suite of 
rights and protections. SER employees accrue rights and protections based on 
increasing length of service and both labour law systems preserve the ongoing 
nature of the employment relationship despite various protected exceptions to 
the wages/work bargain, such as temporary lay-off, stand-down, maternity 
and parental leave, sick leave, carers’ leave, and so forth.61   
The legal precariousness of employment security in both Canada and 
Australia is best viewed as a continuum of increasingly strong rights and 
protections,62 rather than as a binary model of ‘protected’ and ‘unprotected’ 
employment with defined sets of rights and protections. This is not the case 
simply because the number of weeks of notice usually increases with service 
or because employees pass their probationary period and obtain protection 
against unfair dismissal and recall rights, but also because the nature of those 
rights and protections becomes increasingly strong. In both Canada and 
Australia, the interpretation of ‘just cause’ for dismissal varies with length of 
tenure of employment. Employees with longer service often benefit from a 
more protective interpretation of ‘just cause’ or what constitutes a ‘harsh, 
unjust or unreasonable’ termination than those with less service.63 Rights to, 
and the length of, various protected forms of leave also accrue with service. 
                                                 
58 Tham and Campbell, ‘Equal Treatment’, above n 32, 7. 
59 John Howe, Andrew Newman and Tess Hardy, Submission of Centre for Employment and 
Labour Relations Law to the Australian Council of Trade Unions to Independent Inquiry into 
Insecure Work in Australia (January 2012) Australian Council of Trade Unions 12–16 
<http://www.securejobs.org.au/Home/Howe-Inquiry/Submissions.aspx>. 
60 O’Donnell, above n 4, 89. 
61 Kirkpatrick, above n 19, 161–74 
62 Judy Fudge, ‘Beyond Vulnerable Workers’, above n 14, 158. 
63 Owens, Riley and Murray, above n 4, 493. 
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Individual rights to be recalled from lay-off or stand down may also 
strengthen with accrual of seniority.  
Due to the privileged role that this continuum of rights and protections gives 
to length of service as an organising principle, one may ask why temporary 
migrant workers should be entitled to a comparable level of security of 
employment as SER employees, given the short-term duration of their 
employment. Put another way, if it is accepted in principle that security of 
employment ought to be earned through attachment to a particular employer 
(which, it should be noted, is far from universally accepted), why should 
workers hired on fixed-term contracts to meet temporary labour shortages be 
provided with security of employment? The answer to this question is that the 
‘temporary’ nature of their migration is often constructed by the operation of 
law rather than by the reality of the employment relationship.64 In many cases, 
employment may more accurately be characterised as an ongoing relationship 
interrupted by seasonal lay-off and temporary periods of repatriation to the 
worker’s country of origin. Temporary migrant workers therefore often 
become ‘permanently temporary’,65 meaning that they are unable to obtain 
permanent residency, regardless of the number of seasons worked in the host 
country. As noted by Faraday, most CSAWP workers face the prospect of 
‘perpetual recruitment’, whereby employers have absolute discretion 
regarding whether a worker is rehired in subsequent seasons.66 This lack of 
employment security has been frequently reported to produce high levels of 
worker vulnerability with respect to their ability to negotiate and enforce 
workplace rights and entitlements.67 By contrast, other temporary migrant 
worker programs (such as the Live-In Caregiver Program) provide pathways 
towards permanent residency.68 Despite reported difficulties in qualifying for 
permanent residency,69 these programs at least offer the prospect of moving 
beyond the precariousness of ‘permanently temporary’ status. 
This disconnect between length of service and lack of security is particularly 
glaring with respect to the CSAWP, which has been operating since 1966, 
now has approximately 24 000 participant workers each year primarily from 
Mexico and the Caribbean states,70 and is generally characterised by a high 
                                                 
64 Faraday, above n 33. 
65 Jenna Hennebry, ‘Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Workers and Their Integration in 
Canada’ (2012) 26 IRPP Study 1, 3. 
66 Faraday, above n 33, 74. 
67 Ibid 75. 
68 Ibid 4, 25, 101. 
69 Ibid 101. 
70 Ibid 37–43 for further background on the program. 
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rate of worker return in consecutive seasons.71 Lower-end estimates place the 
number of returning workers at 70 per cent each year.72 In a recent study in 
Ontario by Jenna Hennebrey, the average program service was seven to nine 
years, with many workers returning to Canada for upwards of 25 years.73 
The ASWP commenced as the Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme 
in August 2008. Only 1623 workers from nine Pacific states were admitted to 
work for 22 approved employers between February 2009 and September 
2012, with the number in 2012 being 1108.74 Early indications are that repeat 
participation is likely to develop. In particular, in one study, 100 per cent of 
workers surveyed said they wished to return to Australia in subsequent 
seasons.75 Employers have also expressed their desire to hire the same 
workers in subsequent years.76 The evidence from the final evaluation of the 
Pilot Scheme is that the overall return rate may be substantial,77 although the 
ASWP is in its early stages and any conclusions are therefore necessarily 
tentative. Nevertheless, as with the CSAWP, participation in the ASWP is not 
a pathway to permanent residency. ASWP workers, like their CSAWP 
comparators, also therefore bear the risk of becoming ‘permanently 
temporary’.  
Therefore, if it is assumed that the legal rights and protections governing 
security of employment ought to increase with length of service as they do 
with SER workers, temporary migrant agricultural workers under the CSAWP 
and ASWP ought to have their non-continuous length of service recognised at 
law in order to achieve the same or similar rights and protections as SER 
workers with a similar length of continuous service. There are several 
                                                 
71 See, eg, B159/2008 (Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd and United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local 1518) [2008] BCLRB (14 October 2008) [17] (‘Sidhu’). 
72 See, eg, 467 (Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l’alimentation de du commerce, section 
locale 501 c La Légumière Y C inc) [2007] QCCRT (24 September 2007) [19] (‘TUAC c La 
Légumière’). 
73 Hennebry, above n 64, 13. 
74 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (‘DEEWR’), Pacific 
Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme Date Summary (7 January 2013) Department of Employment 
<http://employment.gov.au/pacific-seasonal-worker-pilot-scheme>. 
75 John Gibson and David MacKenzie, ‘Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker (PSWPS): 
Development Impacts in the First Two Years’ (Working Paper in Economics No 09/11, 
Department of Economics University of Waikato, June 2011) 17. 
76 ABC Radio, ‘Reassigned Tongan Guest Workers Upset Local Balance’, Pacific Beat, 4 June 
2009 (Alf Fangaloka) <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights 
/reassigned-tonga-guest-workers-upset-local-balance>.  
77 DEEWR, above n 73. Of the 1623 total workers, 280 returned for a second season, 45 for a 
third and 12 for a fourth. While this number seems low, 1108 arrived in the final year of the 
program (2012). Therefore, of the 515 workers who participated in years where a return to 
Australia was possible (ie 2009–2011), 280 returned for at least a second year.  
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normative arguments to support this reasoning. First, such reforms would 
promote the consistent application of labour laws, which would have two 
principal benefits. Consistency would discourage employer regulatory 
avoidance through reliance upon the lesser legal rights and protections of 
‘permanently temporary’ workers. It would also acknowledge the reality of 
what are often, in fact if not law, long-term employment relationships 
deserving of protection. Second, such an expansion of rights and protections 
would reward the long-term commitment of many CSAWP and ASWP 
workers to their employers, which in turn would facilitate employer retention 
of a trained and skilled agricultural work force. This latter goal is particularly 
important from an employer perspective, given that the need for such 
programs is often justified by employers on the basis of a domestic labour 
shortage of trained and reliable agricultural workers.78  
C The CSAWP and the Legal Regulation of Security of 
Employment 
1 The Migration Law Parameters of the CSAWP — 
Understanding the Seasonal Visa 
In Canada, the general power to issue temporary work visas derives from the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (‘IRPA’)79 and IRPA Regulations.80 
One of the key immigration objectives of the IRPA is to ‘facilitate the entry of 
... temporary workers’.81 All foreign nationals entering Canada on a 
temporary basis must satisfy an immigration officer from Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada that they hold a valid visa and will leave Canada upon 
expiry of their temporary resident status.82  
The guiding principles of CSAWP are contained in the bilateral administrative 
Memoranda of Understanding (‘MOUs’) and accompanying guidelines 
formed between Canada and the labour supplying states.83 The MOUs are 
significant because they prescribe that workers are to be subject to Canadian 
                                                 
78 See Canadian Horticultural Council, Human Resources (29 October 2013) <http://www. 
hortcouncil.ca/projects-and-programs/human resourcces.aspx>. See also National Farmers’ 
Federation, Workplace Relations (2013) <http://www.nff.org.au/policy/workplace.html>. 
79 SC 2011, c 27. 
80 SOR/2002-227. 
81 IRPA s 3(g). 
82 Ibid ss 20(1)(b), 22–4. 
83 B135/2009 (Greenway Farms Ltd and United Food and Commercial Workers International 
Union, Local 1518) [2009] BCLRB (29 June 2009) [103] (‘Greenway’). The MOUs are not 
publically available; the author has therefore relied on copies reproduced as evidence in 
labour board decisions. 
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laws84 (including provincial workplace laws of general application) and that 
employers will sign a copy of an SFEC as a condition of participating in the 
program, which will itself be ‘subject to annual review by both parties and 
amended after consultation with employer groups in Canada’.85 The terms of 
the four SFECs and two transfer agreements vary slightly according to the 
adhering province and labour supplying state. However, each relates to a 
range of terms and conditions of employment, including those relevant to 
termination of employment, namely the duration of engagement and the scope 
and termination of employment. CSAWP visas are limited to a maximum 
duration of eight months between 1 January and 15 December of the same 
year. Within this period, the employer must guarantee a minimum of 240 
hours work over a minimum six-week period. The visa duration may be 
extended beyond the guaranteed minimum however the terms of the SFECs 
expressly state that they cannot extend beyond eight months and the workers 
must reside outside of Canada between December 15 and 1 January.86 Such 
extended terms within the eight month parameter of the visa are often set by 
the SFECs, but these are merely expected dates rather than enforceable 
commencement and completion dates (see below). Unfortunately, there are no 
statistical data that the author is aware of assessing or estimating the actual 
hours worked by CSAWP workers under the visas. 
2 The SFECs — Contractual Notice of Termination 
While it is therefore nowhere legally required by Canadian migration law that 
a contract of employment cannot operate for an indefinite term (as long as the 
employee does not reside and work in Canada outside the parameters of his or 
her work visa), the SFECs are each categorised as fixed-term contracts and 
imposed as a condition of participation in the program. The vast majority of 
CSAWP workers are therefore governed by the express and implied terms of 
these SFECs and employment standards legislation of general application.87 
These sources offer only minimal legal protection of employment security.  
Under the common law of the individual employment contract, where an 
employee is wrongfully terminated from his or her fixed-term contract (that is, 
terminated without just cause or the required period of notice), the employee 
will be entitled to the value of what he or she would have received but for the 
                                                 
84 Ibid [86]. 
85 Ibid [105]. 
86 See Employment and Social Development Canada, Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program 
How to Apply (28 October 2012) <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/ 
agriculture/seasonal/index.shtml#tab5> which includes links to the various SFECs and 
transfer agreements; Faraday, above n 33, 39. 
87 Kinoshita and Nakache, above n 12, 21–2. 
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wrongful termination. In the case of a fixed-term contract, this value will be 
either: (i) the value of the remainder of the fixed-term contract if no express 
period of notice has been stipulated; or (ii) the value of the express fixed-term 
stipulated in the contract; or (iii) in the case of legal uncertainty as to the 
fixed-term nature of the contract, the value of any reasonable notice of 
termination as an implied term of common law.88  
If the value of reasonable notice governs, CSAWP workers are disadvantaged 
relative to SER workers with similar amounts of accrued service. Under 
common law, reasonable notice is calculated based on the age of the 
employee, the length of continuous service, the skill level of the employee and 
other factors.89 Under the fixed-term SFECs, CSAWP workers cannot accrue 
continuous service. Also, they tend to be young, at least in their initial years 
of participation, due to the physical demands of agricultural work. Finally, 
they are ‘unskilled’ by the very terms of the program.90 The amount of 
reasonable notice applicable to such workers at common law therefore tends 
to be low and in any event approaches the level of minimum employment 
standards. 
Regarding the remaining value of the unexpired term of the fixed-term 
contract, the SFECs act to minimise the period of notice in a number of ways. 
First, while SFECs operate for a minimum of 240 hours in a six-week period 
and cannot operate for more than eight months, the period of engagement is 
limited either from the worker’s arrival to the specified termination date or 
‘until the completion of the work for which he is hired or assigned which ever 
comes sooner’.91 The work to be completed is not defined by the contract. 
Therefore, the employer could cut short the term of a CSAWP worker’s 
contract by specifying that the work for which the individual worker was 
hired has been completed. The period of damages would thus be reduced 
accordingly. In interviews conducted with employer association officials and 
their counsel in Ontario by the author in August–September 2012,92 it was 
                                                 
88 Owens, Riley and Murray, above n 4, 303; Mason, Truelove and Dakai, above n 39, 435–40. 
89 Owens, Riley and Murray, above n 4, 303. 
90 Faraday, above n 33, 41. 
91 See, eg, Employment and Social Development Canada, Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Program How to Apply: Agreement for the Employment in Canada of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers in British Columbia — 2014 (September 2013) pt I 
cl 2 <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/agriculture/seasonal/sawpcc2014.pdf> 
(emphasis added). 
92 As noted above, interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis to encourage frank 
discussion and in accordance with ethics approval from the University of Melbourne. 
Interviews were conducted with an official of an employer association involved in the 
administration of the CSAWP on 27 August 2012, an employer association official on 28 
August 2012, a labour lawyer representing CSAWP employers on 29 August 2012, union 
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noted that in the event of layoff the minimum number of hours/duration (240 
hours over six weeks) would apply, although any hours above this amount 
were not guaranteed and were essentially at the employee’s risk. All employer 
association officials, union officials and their counsel who were interviewed 
therefore agreed that in the event of an early termination, CSAWP workers 
were entitled only to the balance payable for this minimum fixed term, 
regardless of the term of engagement. 
This interpretation of the SFECs is supported by the express terms governing 
penalty provisions for the employer’s breach of the agreement. Where the 
employer ‘has not satisfied his obligations under this agreement’, the contract 
may be rescinded by the labour supplying state’s Government Agent on 
behalf of the worker only after the Government Agent and Human Resources 
and Skills Development Canada (‘HRSDC’) has been consulted and an 
attempt to locate alternative employment for the worker has been made. If 
these requirements are met, the employer must pay the worker a sum ‘not less 
than that which the WORKER would have received if the minimum period of 
employment had been completed’.93 While the balance of the remainder of 
240 hours/six weeks does provide some protection in the case of early 
termination, it is also worthy of note that few CSAWP workers would be 
likely to be engaged on such a short contract given that their employers incur 
significant transportation expenses in hiring CSAWP workers from Mexico or 
the Caribbean.  
In addition to terms limiting damages payable in the event of an early 
termination, CSAWP workers are subject to express termination of 
employment clauses in SFECs outside of British Columbia (‘BC’) that 
arguably lower the usual standard for summary dismissal. For example, the 
Caribbean and Mexico SFECs with other Canadian provinces state that a 
worker may be terminated beyond the seven- or 14-day trial period for ‘non-
compliance, refusal to work or any other sufficient reason’.94 The proper legal 
construction of this standard, including whether there are implied rights to 
                                                                                                                    
officials on 31 August and 26 September 2012, a provincial government labour law regulator 
on 27 September 2012, labour lawyers representing CSAWP workers on 26 September 2012 
and 1 October 2012, and a community organiser active among migrant workers on 2 October 
2012. 
93 Employment and Social Development Canada, Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program How 
to Apply: Agreement for the Employment in Canada of Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers in British Columbia — 2014 (September 2013) pt VIII cl 4 
<http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/agriculture/seasonal/sawpcc2014.pdf>. 
94 See, eg, Employment and Social Development Canada, Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Program How to Apply: Agreement for the Employment of Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
from Mexico – 2013 (2013) pt X cl 1 <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers 
/agriculture/seasonal/sawpmc2013.pdf> (emphasis added). 
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procedural fairness in the manner of termination, is currently before the 
Ontario Superior Court.95 However, this clause arguably modifies the 
common law standard of just cause and substitutes a much lower standard of 
protection against summary dismissal.96 Summary dismissal (that is, 
termination without reasonable notice) in both Canada and Australia would 
usually only be justified at law where the employee had committed a serious 
breach of the contract of employment. Examples of such a serious breach 
would often include theft from one’s employer, workplace violence or, as 
noted in the above SFEC clause, non-compliance with a reasonable employer 
order or refusal to work.97  
3 Employment Standards — Statutory Notice of 
Termination 
While the temporary work visa and fixed-term SFEC are linked together by 
the terms of the CSAWP, the MOUs are clear that labour laws of general 
application, including employment standards legislation, also apply to 
CSAWP workers. How do these sources of law govern security of 
employment? An examination of employment standards legislation in BC 
demonstrates CSAWP workers are disadvantaged by their lack of continuous 
service. 
In the BC Employment Standards Act (‘BC ESA’)98 employers are not 
required to provide notice of termination or pay in lieu thereof if ‘the 
employee is employed for a definite term’ or if ‘the employee is hired for 
specific work to be completed in 12 months of less’, unless the ‘definite term 
or specific work is extended for at least three months past its scheduled 
completion’ or it is ‘impossible to perform the work because of some 
unforeseeable event or circumstance (other than bankruptcy, receivership or 
insolvency)’.99 Given the wide latitude of employers under the SFECs to 
unilaterally determine the length of the contract and the current maximum 
                                                 
95 Andrew Lokan and Michael Fenrick, ‘Statement of Claim’ (17 November 2011) in Espinoza 
v Tigchelaar Berry Farms Inc Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No CV-11-
439746 (17 November 2011) UFCW Canada [1] <http://www.ufcw.ca/templates/ufcwcanada/ 
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Dakai, above n 39, 428–32. 
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eight-month fixed-term, CSAWP workers cannot qualify for statutory notice 
of termination. 
Even if the CSAWP workers were not excluded from coverage, notice of 
termination under employment standards legislation would be limited by the 
fixed-term SFECs in other ways. The ESA permits accrual of entitlements to 
notice of termination based on periods of consecutive service only, which are 
not severed by periods of legislated ‘temporary lay-off’ (defined, with certain 
specified variations, as 13 weeks within a 20-week period or a period of recall 
specified in a collective agreement).100 Therefore, even if they were covered 
by the notice provisions contained in the ESA, CSAWP workers would never 
be able to obtain more than the one week of notice (based on periods of 
service of more than three consecutive months and less than one year). The 
period of statutory temporary lay-off for a non-collective agreement covered 
worker would also be insufficient to preserve employment by bridging the 
minimum four month gap required between periods of work in Canada. It is 
also of note that the many CSAWP workers who are employed for the 
minimum 240 hours/six-week period under the SFEC would be unable to 
meet the minimum requirement of three consecutive months of probationary 
service and therefore would not be entitled to any statutory notice of 
termination.101  
4 Collective Agreements — Unfair Dismissal and Recall 
Rights 
In stark contrast to the terms of the SFEC and employment standards 
legislation discussed above, various collective agreements covering CSAWP 
workers recognise accrual of security of employment rights and protections on 
a non-continuous seasonal basis, subject to the parameters of the CSAWP and 
compliance with applicable migration laws. The United Food and Commercial 
Workers (‘UFCW’) has negotiated a number of such innovative collective 
agreements covering CSAWP workers in provinces that permit collective 
bargaining in the agricultural sector. In Mayfair (Manitoba), Floralia, 
Greenway, Sidhu (BC) and in a number of enterprises in Quebec, the 
agreements negotiated provide/provided CSAWP workers with recognition of 
their non-continuous service in a way that formally overcomes the limited 
duration of the work visa.  
While the exact details of each agreement differ, there are a number of similar 
features. First, service is deemed to accrue on a non-continuous basis 
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according to the number of hours or days worked at the enterprise.102 Second, 
probationary periods must be served only once, not in each season.103 Third, 
non-probationary workers obtain the right to expedited grievance arbitration 
(with union representation) and a decision must be rendered within a matter of 
days.104 Workers dismissed without just cause, as interpreted under arbitral 
jurisprudence, have the right to reinstatement to their position. Given the 
particular vulnerability of temporary migrant workers, workers are given the 
right to continue to reside on the employer’s premises until the conclusion of 
the expedited arbitration.105 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, workers 
are provided with a right of recall in subsequent seasons based on their non-
continuous service. Employers must request workers to be named to return in 
subsequent seasons in order of descending seniority, with priority being given 
to Canadians in accordance with the terms of the CSAWP.106  
Therefore, while the agreements expressly recognise that they are subject to 
the migration laws governing the CSAWP,107 workers gain security of 
employment by moving up the continuum of legal rights and protections in 
the same manner as an SER worker. These collective agreements therefore, in 
effect recognise what amounts to a form of migrant worker leave — a period 
of legally protected lay-off coinciding with mandatory repatriation during 
which time the employment relationship is preserved. These rights are further 
buttressed by unfair dismissal protections contained in the collective 
bargaining agreement, which recognise the unique employment relationship 
of CSAWP workers.  
Despite a number of problems related to the certification of CSAWP 
bargaining units, the resistance of decertification efforts (that is, de-unionising 
the enterprise) and the successful negotiation and administration of such 
collective agreements in the first place,108 these agreements point to various 
                                                 
102 See, eg, Agreement between Mayfair Farms Portage (Ltd) and the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (expiry date 21 April, 2011) cl 7.  
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108 See, eg, 595/06/LRA (United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 832 and 
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innovative ways in which security of employment rights and protections could 
be strengthened for temporary migrant agricultural workers. 
D The ASWP and the Legal Regulation of Security of 
Employment 
1 The Parameters of the ASWP – Understanding the 
Seasonal Visa 
The power of the Australian Department of Citizenship and Immigration to 
issue visas to temporary migrant workers under the ASWP is derived from its 
general powers under the Migration Act 1958109 and both general and scheme-
specific provisions under the accompanying Migration Regulations 1994.110 
The Migration Act stipulates that the Minister may grant permission, in the 
form of a visa, for any non-citizen to travel to and enter Australia and remain 
in Australia.111 Classifications of visas are permitted by the Migration Act, 
including temporary visas, which permit the holder to remain in Australia 
either: i) for a specified period, or ii) until a specified event happens or iii) 
while the holder maintains his or her status.112 The Migration Act stipulates 
that the Regulations may specify conditions attaching to visas,113 including 
restrictions as to the ‘work that may be done in Australia by the holder’.114 At 
the time that research relevant to this article was concluded in March 2013, 
the ASWP was governed by a subclass 416 ‘Special Program Visa’.115 For a 
worker to obtain an ASWP visa under subclass 416, the Minister was required 
to be satisfied that the worker ‘seeks to enter Australia to participate in a 
special program of seasonal work conducted by the special program sponsor 
in relation to the applicant’.116  
The administrative details of the ASWP are based on MOUs between 
Australia and the individual labour supplying states.117 With respect to the 
                                                                                                                    
Sidhu and Sons Nursery Ltd. and Sidhu and Sons Nursery Ltd. and United Food and 
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111 Migration Act s 29. 
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2013 THE LEGAL IN/SECURITY OF TEMPORARY MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORK 383 
terms and conditions of employment that apply to ASWP workers, the ASWP 
MOUs contain no standard form employment contracts such as the SFECs 
and are silent on which labour law instrument ought to apply, other than to 
mention the application of relevant Australian ‘industrial instruments’118 
contained in the MOUs. Other program documents, such as the Expression of 
Interest to become an Australian Approved Employer for the Seasonal Worker 
Program, also note that Australian workplace laws are to apply to ASWP 
workers.119  
The terms of the ASWP do however prescribe a commitment of a certain 
number of hours over a certain number of months for all ASWP employers. 
Currently, approved employers must commit to providing 30 hours a week 
between 14 weeks and six months.120 Visas are issued for seven months 
within a 12-month period.121  
2 The Individual Contract of Employment — Contractual 
Notice of Termination 
While the individual contract of employment purports to be a fixed-term 
contract, that fact is by no means clear in practice. Despite the program 
requiring that 30 hours a week be worked for between 14 weeks and six 
months (thereby suggesting a fixed term), the contract of employment has also 
been characterised as ‘casual’ by various employers. Ball notes that: 
The conditions under which seasonal workers in the PSWPS [the ASWP] 
are employed can vary considerably – by state and by the employment 
model preference (for example, permanent versus casual contracts) of 
labour-hire firms that act as the workers’ employers. Problems have also 
arisen due to the differences in the most suitable mechanism. For example, 
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before the scheme began, the Federal Government negotiated a framework 
employment agreement with the peak body representing labour-hire firms. 
Under this agreement, seasonal labourers were to be given all the rights of 
permanent employees, even though they would be in the country for only 
seven months. Within one week of the first season (Tongan) workers 
arriving in Australia, there was discord over the type of employment 
contract under which the workers were employed ... The first employer of 
workers under the PSWPS, the Tree Minders labour-hire firm, claimed the 
50 Tongans would be employed only as casual workers and if there was no 
work they would not be paid … After this, the employment contract was 
changed to a casual work contract with an average of 30 hours a week 
guaranteed pay, which would provide the workers higher total wages than if 
they were under a permanent employment contract. Subsequently, workers 
under the PSWPS have been employed under permanent and casual work 
contracts.122  
The contractual characterisation of some ASWP workers as casual is difficult 
to reconcile with parameters of the scheme. A casual contract of employment 
formally arises anew upon each discrete engagement (that is, each separate 
time the worker performs work) and therefore a worker can be ‘dismissed’ 
simply by the employer refusing to re-employ the worker at the next 
engagement.123 However, the policy justification for the ASWP was that the 
shortage of seasonal workers was sufficiently severe to justify the hiring of 
workers from outside Australia for an entire season. Nevertheless, perhaps 
because casual employment offers ASWP workers (who may desire the 
opportunity to maximise their earnings) a higher hourly wage under the 
Horticulture Award 2010 than a permanent non-casual worker would 
receive,124 the potential to employ ASWP workers casually is now implied in 
the Department of Employment application form by which employers express 
an interest in participating in the program. This form states: ‘For example, an 
Approved Employer in the horticulture industry may nominate to employ 
workers under (i) the Horticulture Award 2010, and (ii) on a casual rate of 
pay, at a minimum hourly rate of $19.49’.125  
This casualisation lessens the security of employment of ASWP workers by 
denying them the right to seek contractual damages for the unexpired term of 
                                                 
122 Rochelle Ball, ‘Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme and its Interface with the 
Australian Horticultural Labour Market: Is it Time to Refine the Policy’ (2010) 25(1) Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 114, 124–5. 
123 Owens, Riley and Murray, above n 4, 186. 
124 See s 14, ‘Minimum Wages’. 
125 Department of Employment, Seasonal Worker Program: Request for an Expression of 
Interest (application) to become an Australian Approved Employer for the Seasonal Worker 
Program (21 October 2013) pt B ‘Selection Criteria’ (f) p vi <http://employment.gov.au 
/information-employers-how-recruit-seasonal-workers>. 
2013 THE LEGAL IN/SECURITY OF TEMPORARY MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORK 385 
their contract of employment (that is, the 30 weekly hours for not less than 14 
hours and not more than six months). As they are not subject to unfair 
dismissal protections, AWSP workers who suffer an early termination of their 
fixed-term contract will only have recourse to courts for breach of contract at 
common law and will therefore face various obstacles similar to those 
considered in relation to CSAWP workers. In particular, contractual damages 
will be limited either to the unexpired period of the short fixed-term contract, 
or reasonable notice at common law, which itself will be limited by lack of 
continuous service, the youth of participant workers, and their low levels of 
formal skill. Interviews conducted by the author with union officials in 
Australia in August 2012 found that collective bargaining negotiations to date 
have focused on securing guaranteed hours and duration of work, even though 
employers have already formally committed to such periods of work as a 
condition of their participation in the ASWP. 
3 The NES and Modern Award — Statutory Notice of 
Termination 
With respect to periods of notice of termination under both the NES126 and the 
Horticulture Award 2010,127 these sources also tie payments to continuous 
periods of service at the date of termination. ASWP workers cannot therefore 
ever accrue more than one week of notice by virtue of the seven month 
duration of their contractual engagement. They may also be excluded from 
this entitlement by virtue of being casual workers,128 or employed for the 
duration of a specified time, task or season.129 
4 Statutory Unfair Dismissal Protections and Recall 
Rights 
The parameters of unfair dismissal legislation are also tied to the SER 
continuous service model and act to exclude ASWP workers from coverage 
regardless of the length of non-continuous service they may have accrued. 
Under the unfair dismissal provisions of the FWA, employees must have more 
than six months or 12 months (for small businesses) of continuous service 
before they obtain protection.130 ASWP workers cannot be continuously 
employed for more than six or 12 months, and therefore cannot satisfy this 
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period of service, even if they are employed for multiple consecutive seasons. 
While local workers are also often exempted by virtue of being seasonal or 
fixed-term employees who have come to the end of the season, task or term of 
their contract,131 they at least have the possibility of maintaining ongoing 
status, particularly given the multiple sequential growing seasons in many 
parts of Australia. Further, even if local workers are not categorised as SER 
workers, they will still enjoy advantages over ASWP workers. If local 
seasonal workers serve out the six- or 12-month waiting period they may still 
apply to the Fair Work Commission for a pay out of the balance of their 
contract if it is terminated prior to its expiry.132 If not re-hired at the end of the 
contract or at the end of a seasonal or casual contract, the employee could not, 
of course, be dismissed as their contract has expired.133 However, if the local 
employee is a regular casual worker with a ‘reasonable expectation of 
continuing employment on a regular or systemic basis’, he or she could still 
obtain unfair dismissal protection.134 Similarly, a worker on successive rolling 
contracts may obtain protection if the substantial reason for the arrangement is 
to avoid the application of the unfair dismissal legislation.135  
By contrast, it could be argued that ASWP workers cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of ongoing employment as their visa requires them to exit the 
country at the end of the season. However, if the ASWP develops the high 
rate of worker return currently characterising the CSAWP (where the average 
tenure of employment is seven to nine years), one might then be able to argue 
for the existence of a ‘reasonable expectation of continuing employment on a 
regular or systemic basis’ despite the worker being required by the temporary 
nature of the visa to leave Australia during the off-season. Such an approach 
is consistent with previous tribunal decisions in Australia recognising that the 
‘reasonable expectation of continuing employment’ is framed in part by the 
nature of the industry and when work is available.136 In Canada, the analysis 
of when work is ‘available’ to migrant workers has in rare cases gone one step 
further. In at least one case137 it has been held that a temporary migrant 
worker applying for employment insurance benefits was entitled to benefits 
because, even though the nature of his work permit would not allow him to 
accept other employment, he was capable of and available to work. Justice 
Hadad held, regarding the meaning of ‘available’ and ‘capable’, that the 
exclusion from benefits was ‘not intended to apply where unavailability is 
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imposed upon a claimant in circumstances beyond his control when the 
claimant is ready, available, and willing to accept employment.’138 Under the 
current state of the law in Australia, however, it appears unlikely that ASWP 
workers would obtain such a favourable interpretation of the ‘reasonable 
expectations’ provision. 
With respect to recall rights following a stand-down, the interviews conducted 
by the author in August 2012 in Australia indicate that no recall rights of the 
kind negotiated by the UFCW in Canada currently exist in Australia with 
respect to ASWP workers. This is not surprising given the small size and 
recent implementation of the program. The potential to negotiate such clauses 
is, however, recognised in the FWA,139 and will be outlined below. 
IV CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR 
LEGAL REFORM  
A Legal Reform Options 
While the granting of ‘migrant worker leave’ would represent a fundamental 
departure from current practice, there are a number of ways in which it could 
be extended to CSAWP and ASWP workers, thus preserving the legal 
continuity of employment.    
As noted in Part III C 4 above, collective bargaining represents one potential 
way to displace the SFEC and overcome the disadvantages associated with the 
seasonal work visa under the CSAWP. A second option would be to amend 
the SFEC so that it becomes a contract of indefinite term, subject to the 
employee passing a single probationary period and complying with all visa 
and migration law requirements of the CSAWP. All periods of mandatory 
repatriation could then be contractually classified as unpaid migrant worker 
leave in the same way as other forms of recognised leave frequently available 
to SER employees (annual leave, carer’s leave, education leave, and so forth). 
Seasonal, non-continuous service would thus be expressly counted towards 
the accrual of notice of termination entitlements and/or a right to be recalled 
in accordance with seniority measured on a non-continuous basis.140 As long 
as the contract does not stipulate that the worker enter, reside and work in 
Canada without a work visa, it does not directly conflict with the migration 
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law parameters of the program. In fact, the practice of negotiating contracts 
within a migration law framework is common in other industries, where 
highly skilled employees sign contracts conditional on the lawful acquisition 
and maintenance of a visa. It is also reflective of the terms of the UFCW 
collective agreements considered above. 
Another key manner in which the security of employment of CSAWP workers 
is regulated is via employment standards legislation. As noted above, such 
legislation currently prevents seasonal CSAWP workers from accruing rights 
and entitlements. By contrast, in the Canadian province of Manitoba, the 
Employment Standards Code141 provides relatively innovative and favourable 
entitlements to all seasonal agricultural workers by permitting the accrual of 
notice of termination entitlements on a non-continuous basis.142 Further 
options available under Canadian employment standards legislation would be 
to extend the definition of ‘temporary lay-off’ or other recognised leave to 
preserve the continuous employment relationship. Again, there is no reason 
why mandatory repatriation of CSAWP workers could not be re-
conceptualised as a form of unpaid leave, thus preserving continuity of the 
employment relationship. 
In Australia, the most direct option for reform would be for the 
Commonwealth government to impose a standard form contract as a condition 
of participation in the program with wording similar to that noted immediately 
above, that is, an ongoing contract with protection of unpaid migrant worker 
leave. It could thus overcome continuous service requirements contained in 
the Horticulture Award 2010 and NES, including those applying to casual, 
fixed-term and seasonal employment. With respect to unfair dismissal 
protections, the term ‘reasonable expectation of continuing employment’ in 
the FWA could be expressly amended to cover non-continuous ASWP 
workers employed in consecutive seasons for the same employer. The FWA 
currently recognises that continuous employment is not broken by certain 
unpaid ‘excluded periods’,143 including community leave,144 a stand down that 
applies under an enterprise agreement or contract of employment or ‘a period 
of leave or absence of a kind prescribed by the regulations’.145 The regulations 
could thus be amended to reflect this period of mandatory unpaid migrant 
worker leave. Alternatively, contracts or enterprise agreements could be 
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negotiated to utilise the ‘stand down’ exception during mandatory seasonal 
repatriation of ASWP workers in a manner similar to the recall provisions in 
the Canadian UFCW agreements. While the recognition of the legal 
continuity of employment for seasonal workers may amount to a fundamental 
reform, it is worth noting that the benefits of other labour law legislation in 
Australia, such as long service leave, already expressly extend to seasonal 
workers in certain cases, regardless of what other employment activities the 
seasonal worker engages in during the off-season.146 Similarly, other labour 
law rights and entitlements have been extended to cover fixed term, seasonal 
or non-standard engagements. For example, in the Victorian building and 
construction sector, industry-wide funds for redundancy pay, sick leave and 
income support, and to support trauma schemes, currently exist. These funds 
permit employees with non-consecutive employment to accrue rights and 
entitlements, regardless of the non-continuous, project-to-project basis of their 
employment.147   
V CONCLUSION 
Despite markedly differing labour law systems and program structures, both 
CSAWP and ASWP workers possess minimal legal rights and protections 
with respect to notice of termination, unfair dismissal and recall rights. These 
disadvantages are due in part to the fixed-term nature of their employment. 
Under the current law, an employer may dismiss a temporary migrant 
agricultural worker regardless of the length of that worker’s non-continuous 
seasonal service. However, while it is often assumed that this must necessarily 
be the case given the fixed-term duration of the work visa, there is no reason 
at law why labour law rights and protections could not be re-conceptualised to 
recognise non-continuous service within the parameters of each program. This 
could be accomplished in both countries by utilising individual contracts, 
collective industrial instruments and legislation to recognise a form of migrant 
worker leave. Such measures would preserve the legal continuity of service 
among ASWP and CSAWP workers and allow the accrual of rights and 
protections commonly enjoyed by SER workers with similar periods of 
continuous service.  
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